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In neoclassical economics, whose golden idyll of general-equilibrium theory has
only lately lost some of its luster, the consumer is important but inactive.  Pareto
is supposed to have said that we do not need the consumer at all so long as he
leaves us a snapshot of his preferences.  It is the logical structure of those
preferences, not choice in any existential sense, that drives the Walrasian engine.
It is easy enough to make fun of this approach.  But our complaint here —
if it can even be called that — is not the verisimilitude of the neoclassical
consumer.  Indeed, neoclassical demand theory is perfectly justifiable within its
scope, even if that scope is far more limited than most realize (Langlois and
Koppl 1991).  In its Marshallian form, that theory has been useful in explaining
the direction of changes in price and quantity in the short run as a result of
changes in boundary conditions.  But for other questions — questions in which
the profession is becoming increasingly interested — the consumer-as-
preferences approach may be inadequate.  In addition to some of the old
questions like fashion and advertising, issues of more recent interest, like the
communicative role of consumption and the boundary between producers and
consumers, require that we take a different tack.  In this essay, we recast the
activities of the consumer not only as production activities but also as problem-
solving activities that require the purchase, development, and invention of
consumption capabilities.
2Consumption as production.
Of course, neoclassical consumer theory (Lancaster 1971, Stigler and Becker
1977) has already absorbed the simile of consumption as production.  Rather
than maximizing a utility function over market goods, the consumer produces
basic utility by choosing among alternative production technologies and
engaging in a household production process in a standard neoclassical way. 
Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 77) argue that their reformulation of the consumer's
choice problem “transforms the family from a passive maximizer of the utility
from market purchases into an active maximizer also engaged in extensive
production and investment activities.”
We very much agree with the notion of consumption as production; but
we disagree with the formulation of production in terms of a production
function.1  The neoclassical account of production considers the productive
knowledge of the firm as given and unproblematic.  The analogy to consumption
would thus require the consumer to be endowed with all the knowledge,
experience, and skills that the production of utility necessitates.
Increasingly, students of the economics of production have sought to open
up the black box of the production function.  One promising alternative is the
dynamic capabilities approach, which is currently infiltrating both industrial
economics and corporate strategy (Langlois and Robertson 1995; Teece and
                    
1 For a broader critique of the Lancaster-Stigler-Becker approach, see Earl (1986, pp. 33-
41).
3Pisano 1994).  In this approach, producers do not find productive knowledge as
given, a matter of “blueprints” available in principle at no cost to all.  Rather,
productive knowledge is a matter of capabilities (Richardson 1972) that are
acquired slowly and at some cost through a historical process of learning.  At the
most fundamental level, these capabilities are in the nature of what Nelson and
Winter (1982) call routines, habitual patterns of skill-like behavior.  As Michael
Polanyi (1958) argued, skills of this sort represent in large part a kind of
knowledge that is “tacit” — it cannot be fully articulated but must be acquired
through observation and practice. 
One of the main implications of this view is that individuals and
organizations are necessarily limited in what they can do well (or cheaply) by
what they have done in the past.  Another implication is that the line between
production costs and transaction costs is far more blurry than one finds it to be
in the literature of organization.2  One cannot take production costs as given and
then explain organizational form or the boundaries of the firm on the basis of the
costs of transacting (however one defines those) alone.  For one thing,
transacting is also an activity that requires skill, and the costs one incurs in
transacting are thus a matter of one’s capabilities.  Moreover, as Langlois and
Robertson (1985) argue, one of the principal costs governing organizational
boundaries are the “dynamic” transaction (or governance) costs of acquiring the
capabilities one needs to take advantage of a profit opportunity.  The
                    
2 Williamson (1985) is perhaps the leading source here.
4organizational question is whether new capabilities are best acquired through
the market, through internal learning, or through some hybrid organizational
form.  And the answer will depend on (A) the already-existing structure of
capabilities and (B) the nature of the economic change involved.
If a profit opportunity requires a configuration of capabilities different
from what already exists in the economy, then a Schumpeterian process of
creative destruction may be set in motion.  If the old configuration of capabilities
is decentralized into what we may loosely call markets, then a reorganization
within a single organization — vertical integration — may most cheaply bring
about the necessary redeployment.  If, by contrast, the old configuration of
capabilities lies within large vertically integrated organizations, creative
destruction may well take the form of markets superseding firms.  History offers
many examples of both. 
The organizational possibilities are tempered by the nature of the
reconfiguration required.  If change is systemic — if it requires simultaneous
change in many parts of a complex system — internal organization may prove
less costly ceteris paribus.  If, however, change is autonomous — if change can take
place in separate subsystems without greatly affecting the way those subsystems
are connected together — then markets, which can take advantage of specialized
and decentralized knowledge, may be at a relative advantage.  Here the issue of
standards enters the picture: for standards are typically ways of fixing the
connections among subsystems so that change is channeled in autonomous
5directions.  Langlois and Robertson (1992, 1995) call this kind of structure a
modular system.
It is our contention in this essay that many of these ideas, developed in
the context of production and of the boundaries of the firm, will translate well
into the domain of consumption and the problem of the boundaries between
consumers and producers.  If, as Becker, Stigler, Lancaster, and others argue,
consumers are really also producers, then consumers, in our approach, require
capabilities in order to consume.  They require skills and routines.  And the
organization of consumption, like the organization of production, will be a
matter of the costs of acquiring new capabilities, which will in turn be a function
of the pattern of capabilities available to the consumer and the systemic structure
of consumption.
Consumer needs and problem solving.
To understand the capabilities that the consumer requires, consider first the
structure of the problem the consumer faces.  The consumer's decision process
starts with needs at a basic level, such as the need for housing, food,
entertainment, or transportation.  To satisfy each need, the consumer faces a
series of choices that utilize institutions and market goods or services in a
production process.  For example, one can satisfy the need for transportation by
walking to the destination, by using public transportation, by driving a car, by
flying on an airplane, and so on.  Moreover, one can undertake each of these
6subactivities in a number of different ways, which in turn evoke successive
needs — and raise several further questions.  What route should I follow in
walking?  Should I take the bus or the subway?  Should I drive my own car or
rent one?   Which airlines should I choose and what itinerary should I follow? 
Satisfying the need for transportation requires the consumer to engage in a
process of problem solving.
Note that the needs of the consumer and the process of problem solving
have a hierarchical structure.  That is, the choice of a certain course of action at a
certain level precedes and sets the parameters of succeeding courses of action. 
For example, if I decide to solve the problem of transportation by driving to the
destination myself, I would then have to decide whether to rent a car or to use
my own.  Suppose I decided to drive a rental car.  I would then need to decide,
for example, the type of a car to rent, the amount of insurance coverage, the
time-length of the rental contract, and so on.  After renting the car, I would need
to decide on such things as the type, amount, and location of gas to purchase or
the exact route to follow in order to reach my destination.  A particular choice at
one level in the hierarchy conditions subsequent decision problems and the
alternatives available at lower levels.
Because of the consumer's cognitive limitations, however, he or she may
not know all the available alternatives at any particular level of the hierarchy or
may be unable to process all of the information about known available
alternatives in order to choose the best course of action.  Decisions at each level
7are thus not simple matters of maximizing with known and given alternatives or
of following clear “blueprints” to satisfy needs.  How then does the consumer
with limitations solve problems in an uncertain world?  What kind of
capabilities should the consumer develop in order to deal with uncertainty and
to sort out and process information in satisfying needs at each level?
Capabilities as routines.
Consumption, as we argued, requires not just given preferences, budget
constraints, and production technology, but also capabilities (knowledge,
experience, and skills).  Developing capabilities is for the consumer a matter of
acquiring routines — persistent patterns of behavior.  Capabilities in
consumption consist of various routines that help in solving problems.  They are
analogous to the routines Nelson and Winter (1982) discuss in the context of
production.  The consumer acquires routines in order to utilize goods in the
production of ultimate utility.  We thus see consumption as a matter of learning
about, choosing among, and creating routines.
Just as needs are hierarchical, so too are the routines used to satisfy needs.
Routines operate at all levels of the hierarchy, those at one level affecting the
operation of routines at lower levels and assisting the consumer's choice among
them.  Routines help the consumer to solve problems at each level by classifying
the information from lower levels and specifying a series of simpler
subproblems.
8Where do consumption routines come from?  The consumer has the
option either of learning about and choosing among already existing routines or
of creating new ones.  Some existing routines might be external to the consumer
and available through markets.  To meet clothing needs, for example, the
consumer might simply hire a consultant who would then utilize his or her own
existing routines to make decisions for the consumer.  Alternatively, the
consumer might acquire some of these routines through experience and
exposure to social and cultural institutions.  For example, the consumer might
follow the current fashion or utilize institutionalized routines such as the
meanings that colors generate about age and gender in a society.
In either case, the consumer must learn and acquire experience in order to
consume successfully.  The existence of bundles of routines that could help solve
problems is of little help unless the consumer knows about them.  To be able to
hire a consultant, the consumer needs to search for available services, learn
about their prices and quality, and get recommendations.  Similarly, to be able to
follow the fashion, the consumer needs to read magazines, watch fashion shows,
visit stores, and so on.  Even though the consumer might have little to do with
the creation of such routines, he or she still has to get involved in learning about
them.
When existing routines are not satisfactory, the consumer might choose
simply to create new routines of his or her own.  The consumer may see existing
routines as unsatisfactory for two interrelated reasons.  On the one hand, the
9consumer may perceive that existing routines do not provide as much
satisfaction as the possible (real or imagined) alternatives.  Changes in
technology or relative prices may have degraded the satisfaction once received
from those existing routines or have opened up the possibility for greater
satisfaction if new routines could be developed.  On the other hand, as a number
of writers (including Bianchi in this volume) have argued, consumers may seek
novelty, and therefore engage in innovation, for its own sake.  That is, novelty —
a certain degree of variety in consumption over time — may be one of the
fundamental requirements guiding the consumer’s production activities.  Just as
satisfactions are not necessarily “better obtained with the proceeds of work than
in the process of work” (Loasby 1995, p. 477), so too satisfactions are not always
better obtained in the fact of consumption than in the process of consumption. 
In general, the desire for a better set of consumption routines and the
satisfactions of acquiring that better set work hand in hand, especially to the
extent that the process of search is never extinguished by its own success.
When, then, markets or other institutions fail, for whatever reasons, to
provide satisfactory or relevant routines, the consumer might create private
regularities of behavior, especially if there are substantial benefits expected from
scale economies at the individual level.  In clothing decisions, for example, the
consumer might decide to create a distinct private style and purchase
accordingly, rather than follow fashion or hire a consultant.
10
Each of these alternatives provides bundles of routines to assist the
consumer's decisions, requiring the consumer either to learn about existing
routines or to create new ones.  But this also means that the consumer also needs
another set of higher-level routines to be able to choose among these bundles of
(sub)routines.  In a fast-changing environment, for example, higher-level
routines might call for the selection of those bundles of lower-level routines that
can respond to change quickly.3  Higher-level routines reflect the consumer's
abilities to select and apply existing routines and to create new ones depending
on specific needs and surrounding conditions.  This point is also relevant to the
issue of novelty.  In our formulation the quest for novelty has a capabilities
dimension as well as a tastes dimension. Thus consumers may possess varying
capabilities for generating — or coping with — novelty.  Moreover, novelty
involves innovating (or, at any rate, switching among) routines, and, as such,
invokes a higher-level set of routines.  And this may have implications for the
boundaries between consumer and producer.
Coordination and structure.
As we saw, producers — firms — provide some of the routines necessary for
consumption.  Even when the consumer creates new personal routines, these
might require using goods and services available in markets.  Consumers have
needs, and firms seek to meet them by providing access to routines.  Acquiring
                    
3 Which may mean having a simpler repertoire of routines or a repertoire of generalized
rather than specialized routines (Heiner 1983; Langlois 1986a).
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routines thus requires the consumers to communicate with producers.  Economic
transaction becomes a matter of matching the needs and routines of consumers
with the routines provided by producers.
Understanding the institutional structure of production and consumption
thus requires more than just relaxing the assumption that productive knowledge
is given.  It requires also relaxing the assumption that the structure of production
and transaction is given.  In underscoring the specialized, idiosyncratic, and
often tacit character of “knowledge, skills, and experience,” the capabilities
approach implies that agents do not automatically share “common knowledge”
of the structure of production and consumption, of the menu of choices
available.  The economic problem of production becomes a coordination
problem:  discovering — or, rather, helping to create — an interpersonally
shared structure of transaction.
Just as conversation cannot take place without shared structures of
meaning, transacting cannot take place in an institutional vacuum.  In both cases,
the problem of coordination is one of sharing structure.  Meaning, indeed, is
always a matter of structure.  A signal — a piece of information — is meaningful
only in terms of some structure that can interpret it.  Donald MacKay (1969)
offers the image of a railroad switching yard in which the configuration of
tracks and switches stands ready to direct the trains passing through it.  By
sending the right electronic signal (or, in older yards, by inserting the correct
key in a switch-box) one can rearrange the configuration of tracks.  The
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meaningfulness of a message thus depends on its form — on the shape of the
key.  And that meaning consists in the change the message effects in the
arrangement of the yard, the selection it makes from the set of all possible
configurations.  Moreover, as Kenneth Arrow (1974) reminds us, the structure
necessary to understand or “decode” a message entails investment in overhead
costs.  To function effectively in a foreign language, for example, we need to
invest time and effort learning the language.  The consumer, we will see, faces a
similar problem.
We can make the same point from the perspective of routines and
capabilities.  The cognitive structure of an individual or of an organization
(broadly understood) is determined by the hierarchical repertoire of routines the
individual or organization has acquired over time (Langlois 1997).  That
cognitive structure in turn conditions which messages from the environment will
register as meaningful.
It is a fundamental notion in linguistics that, although all languages
reflect a similar deep structure of rules, each is in a sense an arbitrary assortment
of symbols.  This is because language is a highly abstract institution (Hayek
1967), one that can accommodate an infinite variety of concrete messages.  The
structure that governs communication — or transaction — between producer
and consumer also obeys an underlying system of rules.  But such a transaction
structure is arguably far less arbitrary or abstract than language.  This is so
because in consumption the constraints and technology are different from those
13
in language, and transaction is aimed at relatively more specific purposes:
namely, the satisfaction of concrete consumer needs in light of institutional and
technological possibilities.
As we suggested above, finding ways of producing ultimate utility for the
consumer is a matter of hierarchical problem-solving in which choices at higher
or more abstract levels condition the choices that are possible at lower or more
concrete levels.  Drawing on traditions in the engineering literature, Clark (1985)
calls these design hierarchies.  For example, the French conceptualization of the
early automobile as a locomotive without tracks led to a different set of
subsequent design choices than did the American vision of the automobile as a
carriage without horses (Langlois and Robertson 1989).  Design is conditioned,
however, not just by technological possibilities but by consumer “needs,” which
we interpret here not just in terms of consumer preferences but also in terms of
the consumer’s repertoire of routines, which in turn determines the hierarchy of
design choices open to the consumer.  The producer’s design problem involves
not just figuring out what consumers want but also what consumers know how to
do (or would be willing and able to learn how to do).4
                    
4 For many good reasons, neoclassical theory rejects the idea that producers somehow
change the tastes of consumers.  And, for many equally good reasons, critics have
attacked neoclassical theory on exactly this ground.  But the issue becomes less
contentious if we see consumers as having “needs” not in a sociological sense but in the
sense of engineering design: the consumer has certain “specifications” that comprise
both tastes and capabilities.  In this view, what may be changing (and what producer
can try to change) are the consumer’s capabilities rather than his or her underlying
tastes.  The idea of changing preferences is problematical; but the idea that people can
be taught or expected to learn and therefore that their capabilities might change is less
problematical.
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Learning about consumer capabilities is a problem akin to the problem of
learning about technology.  The principal difference is that among the “design
choices” open to producers are those involving the teaching of consumers how to
consume.  The roles of producer and consumer are in fact symmetrical, in that
we can also imagine consumers deciding to teach producers about producing. 
This possibility is well known in the case when the consumers are themselves
industrial concerns “consuming” intermediate goods from subcontractors (von
Hippel 1988).  But it can also occur in the case of final consumers.  Hobbyists and
sports amateurs, for example, are often sources of innovation in the gear they
use.
The boundaries between producers and consumers.
What determines the boundaries between producers and consumers? That is,
what determines the extent to which producers will provide the knowledge and
routines the consumer needs for successful consumption and the extent to which
the consumer soi-même will provide them?  Here the analogy between
transacting and communication may be helpful.  Consider the problem of
coordinating with someone who (initially) speaks a different language or the
problem of coordinating the “interface” between two components that (initially)
operate according to different principles or specifications.  In either case, there
are a number of ways to make the connection, all of which involve investment in
an institutional structure.
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One approach is simply to employ an intermediary who speaks both
languages or a device that can convert from the principles or specification of one
component to that of the other.5  When the Americans and Russians wanted their
spacecraft to dock in orbit, they had to construct a module that could accept the
American craft at one end and the Russian at the other.  This approach typically
requires the least fixed investment, at least from the point of view of the
transactors.  (It may in fact require substantial fixed investment from the point of
view of the translator, but that investment can often be spread over many
different transactions with many different parties.) 
If one or both of the transacting parties expects, however, that the
transacting will be ongoing, it may pay for one party to invest in the translation
function rather than employing a third party.  The ultimate form of an
institutionalized translation function is the emergence of common standards.  One
of the parties could decide to abandon its own language or specifications in
favor of those of the partner.  Or both parties could agree on a lingua franca
different from either’s original specifications. 
We can think of the routines and capabilities of producers and consumers
as two (potentially) different languages or systems of specifications.  In the case
of final consumption, this “interface” problem is very often solved by the use of
an intermediary or middleman.  A consultant who chooses my computer
                    
5 In the technological case, this would amount to what David and Bunn (1990) refer to as
a “gateway” technology.
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hardware and software for me, assembles my wardrobe, or even coaches me on
personal fitness is someone knowledgeable both about my wants and
capabilities and about the capabilities of the producers of computers, clothes, or
fitness equipment.  For intermediaries to be effective, of course, they must be
known to their customers: consumers must possess knowledge that such
intermediaries exist and have the (perhaps relatively simple) capabilities to find
and employ them.  It is thus the case that intermediaries themselves internalize
the capabilities necessary for consumers and producers to take advantage of
their services.  As Robertson (1994) puts it, such intermediaries are really
entrepreneurs who connect those who have a problem in need of solution with
those who have a solution in need of a problem.
It is possible, however, for either the producer or the consumer to
internalize the translation (and entrepreneurial) function.  A producer might
bundle its goods with consultant services, as in the case of full-service computer
shops, clothing stores, or fitness clubs.  This requires the producers to be
conversant with the routines of consumers — to be able to size up what Mr. A
needs in a computer or Ms. B wants in a workout — while at the same time
knowing their own hardware.  Whether bundled or independent, however, the
consultant function often has the unintended consequence of imparting new
routines to the consumers in a way that may eventually render the consultancy
obsolete.  It is typical, for example, for producers to bundle consultancy services
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with their products when the products are new in society and then to abandon
the function once knowledge of the technology becomes widespread.
Alternatively, the consumer might internalize the entrepreneurial
translation function.  This is typical of aficionados, who, out of taste or necessity,
explore the deeper reaches of the production process.  In the simplest case, a
consumer might happen to possess capabilities — acquired, perhaps, by poring
over computer or fashion magazines for pleasure -- that render unnecessary the
hiring of a consultant.  In many cases, however, the consumer is forced to
internalize the consultant function by the inadequacy of existing consultant (or
perhaps even of producer) capabilities.  For example, hobbyists were terribly
important in shaping the structure of the early microcomputer industry
(Langlois 1992).  These were largely final consumers — people who wanted their
own computers for personal amusement.  Not only did no consultancy services
exist on the market, few of the necessary complementary capabilities existed on
the market.  So end-users integrated backward into the production of many
components.6  And because these hobbyists did not possess the range of
capabilities typical in large computer firms, each was forced to concentrate only
on a small subset of complementary activities, which necessitated
standardization and modularity in architecture to permit autonomous
innovation.  In addition, the hobbyists banded together into user groups to share
                    
6 Of course, these hobbyists also appreciated the process of fabrication for its own sake;
but it’s not clear to what extent the joys of assembly would have outweighed the
desirability of a more-powerful computer had one been available ready-assembled from
producers.
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capabilities, teach one another, and circulate the latest information — a practice
that had also been common at the dawn of the mainframe era (Fisher et al. 1983,
pp. 31-32). 
This point underscores the importance of historical process in explaining
the boundaries of the firm (Langlois and Robertson 1995) or, in this case, the
boundaries between producers and consumers.  Whether and to what extent
functions will be internalized or left to the market will depend in significant part
not on transaction costs in the abstract but on the changing distribution of
capabilities in the economy. 
Unlike the more general problem of explaining the boundaries of the
firm, however, the problem of explaining the boundary between producers and
consumers presents us with a useful asymmetry.  If we mean by consumers final
consumers — individuals and households — then those consumers will be
necessarily limited in their production capabilities.  This suggests that
integration by the consumer will be limited to what we have called the
consultant function and perhaps to small-scale production.  Innovations in
consumption routines that are driven by the consumers themselves will thus
typically take the form of a recombination of existing possibilities — off-the-shelf
artifacts and external capabilities available through the market — with perhaps
some innovative behavioral patterns and routines.  The consumer may be forced
into small-scale production to fill gaps, but will likely hand off production (or
will become a producer and cease being primarily a consumer) if the scale of
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operations involved becomes large.  As we have suggested, this may imply that
consumer-generated innovation may tend more than producer-generated
innovation to result in modular systems, especially if the innovation is motivated
by relatively pragmatic concerns rather than by the joys of innovating itself. 
If  consumers primarily seek novelty for its own sake — as in clothing, for
example — then they would likely chafe at standards.  On the other hand,
modular systems are a kind of standard that actually facilitates the generation of
novelty by reducing the costs of assembling a product to taste, at least within the
bounds of compatible modules.  In the clothing case, one can think of the Land’s
End catalogue as a kind of modular system that, by offering a varied assortment
of mix-and-match clothing elements within a coordinated design paradigm
(which some might describe as the preppy look) one can fine tune a wardrobe to
one’s taste with low transaction costs.  But the avant-garde would regard even
this vast array of modules as far too confining, and would insist not only on new
modules but on new architectural configurations.7  Such architectural innovation
(Henderson and Clark 1990), however, requires a higher level of skill on the part
of the innovator, and we thus tend to find such complex design activities as high
fashion or domestic architecture delegated to specialists, who tend also to have
internalized the function of communicating with their consumers.
                    
7 The avant-garde of the East Village, as against the Upper East Side, might, however, be
content to assemble their own fashion from a set of modules that extends well beyond
what is available in catalogues
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The interaction among consumers and between consumers and producers
might actually amplify the eventual effects of an initially small-scale innovation
in consumption routines by some consumers.  For example, if, as Bianchi argues,
novelty is an argument in an individual’s satisfaction function (or, in our
terminology, is one of the consumer’s abstract needs), then it follows that
individuals differ from one another in terms of their desire for — and, as we
have argued, their ability to manage — novelty.  This difference in turn provides
the setting for a trickle-down effect in the spread of innovation, and suggests a
mechanism by which the cumulative effect of innovation can become quite large.
Unsatisfied by the available routines, those who seek novelty the most will
initiate an innovation using what is likely to be small-scale production.  Other
consumers will then learn about the new routines and imitate them according to
their various tastes and capabilities for novelty.  In a process long ago described
by Leibenstein (1950), more and more consumers will jump on the bandwagon
as the degree of novelty of the new routines, declining as more and more people
hop aboard, reaches their threshold levels.  The decline in novelty will make the
avant-garde jump off the bandwagon, of course; but if the distribution of novelty-
seeking in the population is appropriate, the cumulative effect can be large. In
general, however, bandwagon effects of this sort will apply only to some new
routines, and their importance will vary not only with the distribution of the
proclivity for novelty but also with the technical characteristics of the new
routines. 
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Note that it may not be economical at first for a producer to invest in
large-scale provision of a new routine to the consumers, even if he or she knows
about it.  A new routine might thus continue to involve small-scale production
by consumers if its adoption is confined to a narrow group.  But as a popular
innovation spreads among consumers, it might at some point become
economical for a producer to invest in the necessary capabilities and engage in
large-scale manufacture.  When consumers initiate innovation, economies of
scale may be the end result, but they are not the starting point.
By contrast, innovation initiated by producers may well be driven by
economies of scale.  In the view of Alfred Chandler (1977), the innovation of
branded packaged goods in the nineteenth century was a way of taking
advantage of economies of scale and scope in production and distribution.  In
the early part of that century, the consumer typically dealt with an intermediary
— the keeper of the general store — who measured out units of bulk items and
assured the quality of the goods.  With the technological change and the
lowering of transportation costs attendant on the development of the railroads, it
became economical to process and subdivide many types of commodities
centrally.  This removed from the retailer the consultancy function, which was
taken over by the manufacturer in the form of a recognizable brand that
conveyed content information and guaranteed quality.  This in turn required
consumers to adapt, albeit without much trauma, to new consumption routines. 
Here too, however, the result may be thought of in terms of the emergence of
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standards.  The creation of the idea of a “brand” standardized meanings for the
consumer, who no longer needed to rely on the good offices of the grocer and
could instead avail himself or herself of a more-transparent “interface” with the
producer.
Indeed, one might argue that, over time, the emergence of standards will
tend to crowd out entrepreneurial consultancy as a solution to the problem of
consumer-producer communication, all other things equal.  One of the cetera we
must hold paria for this to be true, however, is income.  It seems clear that rising
incomes would militate in favor of increased use of outside consultancy in
consumption.  As income goes up, time becomes relatively more scarce; and
consultancy — and the outsourcing of consumption and household production
activities in general — is a way of economizing on time.  Moreover, quality is a
normal good, so increasing incomes will mean greater demand for non-
standardized products that, because they involve idiosyncratic routines and
specialized knowledge, require greater amounts of consultancy for their
consumption.  Also, on the production side, computerized and flexibly
specialized manufacturing processes may make it possible to provide
personalized commodities without great loss of scale economies.
Nonetheless, if we control for such factors, the extent of standards must
increase over time.  In the Marshallian long run, which allows for incremental
innovations but not major discontinuities, we should expect transaction to
become more routinized as producers and consumers learn more about each
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other and have time to adapt their routines to one another.  We need only think
of the old story about the prisoners who spent so many years in each other’s
company that they had numbered all the jokes they knew and could send one
another into fits of laughter simply by calling out “21.”  The translation function,
and the internalization it sometimes requires, may be a response to economic
change rather than the result of any steady-state advantages it might have
(Langlois and Robertson 1995).
Conclusion.
Consumers are active — not only because they may seek novelty or choose in an
existential context but also because they are in effect producers, who must
actively organize their own consumption using the skills and routines they
possess or can acquire.  The boundaries between consumers and producers are
permeable.  They shift in response to entrepreneurial possibilities seized by
consumers, producers, or both; and the pattern of change will be governed by
the historical distribution of capabilities among consumers and producers and
by the technological characteristics of the products involved. 
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